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Small-scale farmers' supply response for traditional varieties may seem puzzling from an
economic point of view if di®erences between shadow prices and market prices are not taken
into account. The market price may fail to represent the true decision price if farmers attach
non-market values to their crop (Brush and Meng, 1998; Smale et al., 2003; Altieri, 2004;
Dyer Leal, 2006; Bellon et al., 2006). We test whether decision prices are equal to market
prices for maize farmers in rural Mexico, and if not, what accounts for the divergence between
the two. If high shadow prices play a role in farmers' continued cultivation of maize, then
information about these prices may be a valuable input into the design of in-situ conservation
programs.
Mexico is the center of maize domestication and diversity, where farmers have selected
and cross bred traditional maize varieties since 7000 BC (Dowswell et al., 1996; Turrent
and Serratos-Hernandez, 2004). It hosts the largest genetic diversity of maize in the world,
with 59 di®erent races that are valuable inputs to crop breeding research for the worlds'
most widely used food grain (Berthaud and Gepts, 2004; Yunez Naude and Taylor, 2006).
Maize farming in Mexico is primarily carried out by small-scale subsistence farmers, who
cultivate landraces and contribute to both the creation and conservation of crop genetic
diversity (Berthaud and Gepts, 2004; Brush and Chauvet, 2004).
1 Given the importance
of on-farm conservation in complementing conservation in gene-banks, Mexico is an ideal
place to study farmers' incentives to maintain maize landraces and improve the e±ciency of
on-farm conservation programs.
1A landrace is a crop cultivar that evolved with and has been genetically improved by traditional agricul-
turalists, but was not in°uenced by modern breeding practices. All components of landraces are adopted to
local climate conditions, cultural practices, diseases and pests (Hoisington et al., 1999; Jarvis et al., 2000).
12
2. Background
The term \shadow price" commonly refers to the value of goods or services not traded
in markets (Becker, 1965). More accurately, the shadow price is the decision price. For a
commercial farmer or agricultural household producing in a context of well-functioning and
complete markets, this price is given exogenously by the market (Singh et al., 1986). In the
absence of perfect and complete markets, the decision price may instead be an endogenous
shadow price. When a household is constrained to produce and consume at its internal
equilibrium, the shadow price is shaped by variables in°uencing both supply and demand
(Singh et al., 1986; de Janvry et al., 1991; Taylor and Adelman, 2003). In an economy where
many farmers are subsistence producers, the structure and determinants of shadow prices
may be critical in shaping cultivation decisions and crop genetic diversity outcomes.
2
Shadow prices may diverge from market prices because of high transaction costs of buying
and selling, as postulated by de Janvry et al. (1991). Alternatively, the divergence may
result from an imperfect substitutability between market-purchased and home-grown crops.
Agricultural households in less developed countries generally consume part or all of their
output and supply part or all of their inputs (Chihiro, 1986). Early studies in the agri-
cultural household literature assume perfect markets, but later ones allow for imperfect or
missing markets, which are common in developing countries (Singh et al., 1986; Jacoby, 1993;
Skou¯as, 1994; de Janvry et al., 1991; Taylor and Adelman, 2003). While most use market
prices to value agricultural output, de Janvry et al. (1991); Key et al. (2000) and Taylor and
Adelman (2003) analyze farmer decisions under missing product markets and represent the
2Throughout this text we use the term \subsistence farmer" to refer to small scale farmers who produce
mainly for home consumption.3
value of the constrained food crop with a shadow price. Missing markets in these models are
farmer-speci¯c and arise from transaction costs that trap some farmers within a price band.
Shadow prices may diverge from market prices even in the absence of high transaction
costs. Imperfect substitutability in consumption implies an asymmetric (one-sided) missing
market: the farmer can sell the crop at the market price but must produce it in order to
consume it. This is similar in spirit to the "partly absent market" de¯ned by Strauss (1986).
The crop is a distinct consumption good, due to qualities it embodies that are not valued
in the market. The value which the household attaches to these qualities is re°ected in the
shadow price. The home-produced crop may be transformable into a market good (via sales).
When the crop is sold, the decision price becomes the market price. The market price thus
represents the lower bound on the shadow price in an asymmetric missing market.
In an asymmetric-market model, a crop can be conceptualized as a bundle of multiple
characteristics. These characteristics include production attributes, consumption attributes,
the subjective importance farmers place on conserving their seed, which may have provided
subsistence to the family for decades, and other non-market bene¯ts (Brush and Meng, 1998;
Smale et al., 2001, 2003; Edmeades et al., 2004; Badstue et al., 2006; Dyer Leal et al., 2006).
3
All of these characteristics are convoluted where the seed is also the consumption good.
Studies of technology adoption focus primarily on production considerations, including
seed attributes (e.g., plant strength, resistance to pests and disease, ear length, °owering
time, adaptability to certain environments), agro-ecological conditions, risk, and informa-
tion constraints that may shape farmers' variety choices (e.g., see Feder (1980); Just and
Zilberman (1983); Bellon and Taylor (1993)). Market-determined output prices are used to
3Small maize farmers in Mexico value maize for traditional, ceremonial, ritual values, as well as di®erent
tastes and cooking qualities (Fussell, 1992; Salvador, 1997; Berthaud and Gepts, 2004; Brush and Chauvet,
2004; Dyer Leal, 2006).4
value output in most technology adoption models. In contrast to the other social science dis-
ciplines, economists have paid less attention to understanding how consumption attributes
and non-market values a®ect the values farmers attach to their crops.
Subsistence farmers in Mexico demand a diversity of consumption attributes of maize,
including ease of shelling and processing, color, taste, softness of dough and suitability for
certain dishes, and these have been found to be correlated with on-farm genetic diversity of
maize landraces (Smale et al., 2003; Bellon, 1996; Bellon et al., 2006; Perales et al., 2003).
Some attributes are unobservable and may create an imperfect market for crops with the
speci¯c bundle of traits that farm households demand. The di±culty of buying a crop with
a given set of consumption traits may be compounded if, as is typically the case, di®erent
maize varieties are mixed in the market, where it is virtually impossible to observe some
attributes that are important to farmers.
4 Agricultural price support policies in Mexico
traditionally have not di®erentiated among maize varieties. Unless every farmer's maize is of
identical quality, it is impossible for the farmer to recover from the market the same quality
that is perceived to exist in his or her own crop. Thus, some farmers may prefer to produce
and consume their own crop, even at a cost that is well above the market price, in order to
ensure the supply of all of the consumption traits they demand.
Non-market value may include the ceremonial or ritual importance associated with cul-
tivating and consuming the subsistence crop. For indigenous farmers in Mexico, it appears
to derive partly from one's identity as a good maize farmer and member of the community
(Fussell, 1992; Smale et al., 2003; Badstue et al., 2006; Perales et al., 2005). When the
4There could exist di®erent silos for each maize quality, however, this would be very costly; visits to market
places reveal that in practice few farmers have access to such ¯nely di®erentiated markets for maize quality.5
market for seed quality is also imperfect, an additional motivation for cultivating traditional
varieties may be to maintain the family's seed stock and pass it down across the generations.
Findings from surveys in Mexico indicate signi¯cant di®erences in perceived consumption
characteristics of home-produced and purchased maize (Smale et al., 2001; Preibisch et al.,
2002; Dyer Leal and Yunez Naude, 2003; Dyer Leal, 2006). It is not uncommon to ¯nd
that small scale maize farmers incur cash losses when their output is valued at the price
of maize available in local markets (Heath, 1987; Dyer Leal and Yunez Naude, 2003; Brush
and Chauvet, 2004). Rather than re°ecting the \irrationality" of maize farmers, this ¯nding
likely results from the use of the wrong price to value maize production. When one takes
into account the non-market bene¯ts that farmers accrue from cultivating and consuming
their own maize, cash losses may lose signi¯cance (Dyer Leal et al., 2002).
Past studies also ¯nd that most maize farmers in Mexico consume most or all of their
harvest, consistent with both a transaction-cost and asymmetric-market model. Empirically,
it is extremely di±cult to test whether a divergence between shadow and market prices
is the result of transaction costs or an asymmetric market, because broadly speaking, an
asymmetric market could be conceptualized as a variant of a transaction cost model. In
theory, a farmer might be able to ¯nd a variety in the market that is virtually identical to
the one she could grow at home, or even select speci¯c varieties out of the mix available in the
market. This would entail transaction costs associated with information, search and sorting,
however. Cultural considerations associated with cultivating maize, e.g., to preserve one's
identity within the community, by de¯nition endow home-produced maize with attributes
for which there is no substitute in the market.6
These arguments are not unique to maize and Mexico. Indigenous farmers in the Peruvian
Andes prefer cultivating traditional potato varieties that are associated with various non-
market bene¯ts (Brush, 1992). Similarly, maize in Guatemala, wheat in Turkey and rice in
the Philippines have been associated with consumption characteristics that make it di±cult
to purchase close substitutes in the market (Meng et al., 1998; Bellon et al., 1998; Isakson,
2007).
Centers of crop domestication and diversity are particularly important for the conserva-
tion of traditional crop varieties. Traditional varieties are the main source of crop genetic
diversity because of millennia-old evolution and farmer selection to match seeds with het-
erogenous soil and climate conditions, as well as to meet various consumption needs (Liu
et al., 2003; Berthaud and Gepts, 2004). The resulting genetic diversity is one of the most
important material inputs for crop breeding research that improves yields and resistance of
world food crops (Koo et al., 2003). Crop breeders agree that on-farm conservation allowing
continued crop evolution in natural environments is an essential complement to gene banks
(Brush, 1989; Bellon and Smale, 1999). On-farm conservation programs depend on farm-
ers' incentives to continue cultivating these crops (Bellon and Smale, 1999). Dyer Leal and
Yunez Naude (2003) and Brush and Meng (1998) acknowledge the need to use shadow prices
instead of market prices to understand subsistence farmers' incentives to cultivate traditional
crops with high non-market values; however, previous research does not explicitly do this.
3. Theoretical Model
The theoretical foundation for our empirical estimation of shadow prices can be illustrated
by a simple model of an agricultural household in the presence of a market constraint for
the subsistence maize crop. This market constraint is asymmetric, such that the farmer can7
sell the crop but cannot buy maize of identical quality in the market. It re°ects non-market
values attached to home-produced maize that make purchased maize an imperfect substitute
in consumption.
5 Consequently, the home-produced and purchased maize enter the utility
function as separate consumption goods.
6
Suppose that a farmer produces output (Q) of the subsistence maize crop using labor
(L), a ¯xed amount of land (A) and a technology described by the production function
Q = g(L;A).7 Farmers allocate family and hired labor to the crop and output to home
consumption (Xh
s ) and the market (Xs
s), in the latter case receiving a ¯xed price, ps, per
unit sold. They also allocate income to consumption of the market-purchased crop (Xm),
and family time to work and leisure (Xl). The household's assumed objective is to maximize
utility derived from consumption of home-produced maize, the purchased crop and leisure,
U = U(Xh
s ;Xm;Xl;Z). The agricultural household model of Singh et al. (1986) is a special
case in which subsistence maize is a perfect substitute for market-purchased maize and
transaction costs are nil.
Under the assumption of a perfect labor market as in Singh et al. (1986), the household
can hire out its own labor and hire in as much labor as it wishes at an exogenous market
wage w.
5\Subsistence" and \home produced" are used interchangeably in this paper.
6Through informal interviews with maize farmers in 2 states (Puebla and Oaxaca) and 15 di®erent com-
munities in Mexico during July 2005, we have found that most farmers prefer their traditional maize for
consumption; do not like modern varieties (either because they do not have the perfect growing conditions or
do not like tortillas made with modern maize); think that maize production is \not just to generate income"
and has some non-market values. These observations suggest two broad categories of maize; home-produced
maize that is mostly traditional maize and purchased maize that is mostly modern maize.
7Finan et al. (2005) ¯nd that land rental markets in rural Mexico are very inactive with only 5% of farmers
participating in rental market using 1999 data from 25,000 households. This ratio is 7.6% of all plots for
data used in the empirical analysis of this article.8




...subject to full-income and production constraints
pmXm + wXl · psX
s











s ;L ¸ 0: (3)
¹ Y denotes exogenous income, and Z is a vector of household characteristics shaping marginal
utilities of consumption, Ui; i = s;m. U(:) is a continuously di®erentiable and strictly quasi-
concave utility function, and g(:) is a quasi-convex production function.
The full-income constraint 1 states that total expenditure on the market good and leisure
cannot exceed the value of marketed surplus net of labor costs plus the value of the family's
time endowment (T) and exogenous income. Constraints 2 and 3 are of special interest.
Together they de¯ne the market constraint for the subsistence crop. Constraint 2 states
that the consumption of the subsistence crop cannot exceed the total amount produced
minus sales when an identical good cannot be obtained in the market. The non-negativity
constraints state that the consumption of home-produced maize, marketed surplus and labor
used for maize production cannot be negative (but they may be zero).8;9
8We assume that the marginal utilities of the ¯rst unit of leisure and the market goods are very large (i.e.
MUnjXn=0 = 1, n = l;m), hence we are not concerned about a corner solution for Xl and Xm.
9This might be the case if, for example, the household did not produce the crop or its marginal utility from
purchased maize were very low.9



















We discuss the ¯rst order conditions (FOC) and the Karush-Kuhn-Tucker (KKT) condi-
tions for variables that can have corner solutions in detail in the Appendix.10 The optimal
solution implies that an agricultural household with perfect markets will equalize the ratio





the present model, where the market for the subsistence good is asymmetric, this condition








For farmers who produce some subsistence crop and consume some of it, ¹3 equals to zero;
hence
¹1
¸ takes the place of ps in the conventional optimality conditions. Given this opti-






which equals ps if the household sells this crop. ¹1 is the marginal utility of having one more
unit of Qs, and ¸ is the marginal utility of income.11 The shadow price is conceptually similar
10For the KKT conditions to be su±cient for a maximum, we assume that the utility function is pseudoconcave
in addition to the quasi-concavity and quasi-convexity assumptions above. Pseudoconcavity also implies
quasi-concavity because U(.) is pseudoconcave if and only if its gradient vanishes only at the global optimum
and it is quasi-concave (Simon, 2006).







to de Janvry et al. (1991); however, the conditions under which it arises are di®erent.
12 Some
farmers may not participate in markets if the non-market bene¯ts of the subsistence crop
are signi¯cant for them. For farmers who sell part (all) of their subsistence crop, the shadow
price is equal to (less than or equal to) the market price. If, however, the farmer consumes
all of Q at home (i.e. Xs
s = 0), this implies that the shadow price is greater than or equal








¹2, the multiplier associated with the non-negativity constraint for Xs
s, represents the utility
the farmer would enjoy by being able to buy an identical product in the market. Therefore,
farmers constrained by the non-negativity constraint for Xs
s value the subsistence crop more
than does the market.14
Conceptually, this model di®ers from the TC band model in two ways. First, the upper
limit of the TC band depends on the how costly it is for a household to purchase a homo-
geneous good on the market, whereas in the asymmetric model it depends on the cost of
¯nding a close substitute for the subsistence crop in the market. Second, in the asymmetric
model, the lower limit of the TC band is higher for farmers who attach a higher value on
their domestic crops (implying less substitutability between the domestic and market crop).
Figure 1 demonstrates how allowing for imperfect substitution a®ects the traditional TC
band model using the graphical presentation in Taylor and Adelman (2003).
12½, is the monetary value the household would attach to having an additional unit of Q, i.e., the additional
income required to increase the household's utility by the same amount as one more unit of subsistence crop
production { holding the technology and inputs constant (Heckman, 1974).
13For this group of farmers ¹2 ¸ 0 and ¹3 = 0. See Appendix for details.




¸ ¡ ps provides more intuition by monetizing
all terms. The monetized value of relaxing the non-negativity constraint on sales by one unit is equal to the
subjective value of one more unit of production using the same inputs minus the market value of that crop.
Hence the conclusion that the shadow price is greater than or equal to the market price for farmers who do





























Figure 1. Transaction cost band and imperfect substitutability in consumption due to
non-market values of domestic crop. The top panel shows the wider TC band for I = 1 as
opposed to the TC band for I = 0. The bottom panel shows the higher selling price required
to enter the market by farmers with I = 1.
Consider two agricultural households, one that attaches high non-market values to the
home-produced crop (I = 1) and another that does not (I = 0). Suppose that both are
identical in all other respects, including facing the same observable transaction cost associ-
ated with buying (tb) and selling (ts) a unit of average-quality maize in the market at price
p. In this example, a a farmer with I = 0 will produce Qs and buy maize equal to the12
di®erence between demand and supply of domestic maize (i.e. Xs ¡Qs). However, a farmer
with I = 1 will not buy at the given price, because for her the transaction costs associated
with ¯nding a close substitute for the domestic good are higher. This is represented by the
wider transaction cost band for this farmer. (See the bold dashed upper limit of the TC
band for I = 1). Some farmers with I = 1 do not buy maize in the market even though
they face the same transaction costs as others who are in the market. Farmers who have
higher unobserved transaction costs will begin buying in the market only after the market
price and/or observable TC is lower than p0
m(1 + tb), corresponding to a lower market price
p0
m. As a result, supply response to market signals may be more inelastic than depicted in a
conventional transaction cost model
The bottom panel of ¯gure 1 depicts the demand for maize by the two farmers. The higher
valuation of the subsistence crop for I = 1 is represented by the greater willingness to pay
for home-grown maize and less willingness to sell at the market price.
For farmers within the TC band de¯ned as above, production decisions are a®ected by
the shadow price, which in turn depends on household characteristics that would not a®ect
production under perfect market scenario.
Estimation Strategy for the Shadow Price. For a farmer who produces the subsistence
crop (i.e. ¹4 = 0), the FOC for L yields:
¹1MPLs = ¸w (8)
The left hand side of equation 8 represents the marginal bene¯t the farmer receives (in utility
terms) from allocating an additional unit of labor to the production of the subsistence crop.13
The right hand side represents the marginal cost of that last unit of labor in utility terms.15








When the shadow price exceeds the market price, farmers appear to allocate excessive
amounts of inputs to the subsistence crop. A high shadow price can explain the rationality
of farmers' behavior by capturing the non-market values associated with the subsistence
crop.
Given Equation 9 and using an empirical method similar to that used in the shadow wage
models of Jacoby (1993) and Skou¯as (1994), we can econometrically estimate household-
speci¯c shadow prices, test whether they are signi¯cantly di®erent from market prices and
analyze the determinants of this di®erence. The method entails estimating production func-
tions for maize in subsistence and commercial households; using equation 9 to obtain shadow
price estimates; then testing for di®erences between these and market prices.
4. Estimation and Decomposition of Shadow Prices
The empirical analysis uses agricultural household data from the Mexican National Rural
Household Survey (ENHRUM), carried out in January-February 2003. The sample of 1782
households was designed by the National Institute of Statistics, Geography and Informatics
(INEGI) to be nationally representative of rural Mexico.16 The survey gathered the data
15This is because ¸ is the marginal utility of income and it is multiplied by the wage the farmer pays for
labor.
16For a geographical distribution of the communities in the ENHRUM sample see http://precesam.colmex.
mx/ENHRUM/Encuenta\%20Hogares_archivos/Mapa\%20regiones1.htm.14
required for this analysis, including information on household demographics; plot level in-
formation on inputs and output of all crops; marketing and consumption of agricultural and
livestock products; and maize seed varieties and their origins. It also gathered information
about migration and work histories, o®-farm income sources, credit market participation and
household assets.
17
The survey covers all agricultural activities in two crop cycles (Spring-Summer and Autumn-
Winter) in 2002. 573 households cultivated maize on 897 plot-cycles. Input data at the plot
level make it possible to control for plot characteristics when estimating production func-
tions. This is di±cult for plots with multiple crops, however. Thus, we restrict the analysis
to plots cultivated only with maize, which constituted 63% of all maize plots and 67% of
maize growing households in the sample.
18 Among plots monocropped in maize, 86% were
planted with traditional varieties (TVs) as opposed to modern varieties (MVs; table 1).
19 In
the South-Southeast Region, which includes the poorest and most heavily indigenous states
in Mexico, 92% of the plots were cultivated with TVs. In the Northwest Region, which
includes states with higher GDP per capita, large scale farming and industrial production
(Chiquiar, 2005), only 15% of plots were cultivated with TVs.
Summary statistics in table 1 reveal that households in the South-Southeast and Central
Regions have lower wealth; own less land, mostly not irrigated; and are more likely to
17For more details on the ENHRUM data see: http://precesam.colmex.mx.
18We tested whether some key variables that a®ect households' production and preferences di®er signi¯cantly
between the sub-sample and the whole sample. We conclude that the subsample we use in the empirical
analysis is not statistically signi¯cantly di®erent from the whole sample. Details are available upon request.
19Classi¯cation of maize into distinct varieties is problematic due to the open pollinated nature of maize
(Bellon et al., 2006). We use farmer de¯nitions to classify maize into traditional and improved varieties.
Traditional maize (TV) refers to maize identi¯ed as \criollo" by farmers. Modern maize (MV) refers to
maize identi¯ed as \h¶ ³brido."15


























South-Southeast 92 1.63 6.71 9.57 74 2,105 9
Central 93 2.03 1.74 21.06 29 7,572 7
Western Cent. 78 3.46 8.37 17.21 2 12,705 31
Northwest 15 4.85 21.43 61.54 0 124,596 83
Northeast 80 2.95 61.73 7.09 3 8,260 13
Total 86 2.28 10.93 15.85 4 9,067 14
belong to an indigenous community.20 They also have less farm income and sell only small
percentages of their total maize production.
In the full sample, 74% of households did not sell any maize in the market, and this
proportion increases to 80% for households that grow only TVs. Controlling for variables
likely to in°uence transaction costs, we expect the shadow prices of TVs to be higher than
market prices for these households, re°ecting the non-market bene¯ts farmers receive from
them.
4.1. Econometric Model: Estimating production functions and shadow prices of
maize. The production technologies of MVs and TVs are di®erent. MVs require irrigation
and regular application of fertilizers and pesticides, whereas TVs are usually grown on rain-
fed land with little or no fertilizer. Farmers perceive that TVs are more resistant to pests
and diseases during storage, which makes them preferable for subsistence households that
save their own seed (Bellon et al., 2006). Some of these di®erences can be observed in
table 2. There is a three-fold di®erence between the yields of the two types of maize. TVs
are produced on smaller plots, with more labor, less fertilizer and less investment. 69% of
20The wealth index was created using Principal Component Analysis based on the characteristics of house-
holds' primary residence, access to utilities, and ownership of a television and refrigerator. Quintiles of the
wealth index give an idea of the distribution of wealth in the sample.16
Table 2. Summary Statistics for Plots Cultivated with TV and MV
Variable name De¯nition TV MV
yieldpha Yield (kg./ha.) 875.71 2821.24
noryieldpha Yield in a normal year 1471.31 3914.08
land Plot area (ha.) 1.94 3.41
seedpha Seed amount/ha. 19.36 21.77
totlabpha Total labor (days/ha.) 58.93 39.08
machpha Total machinery hours/ha. 6.42 25.03
animpha Total animal hours/ha. 15.62 7.53
inpcostpha Total input cost/ha. (fert.&pestic.) 474.83 642.25
investpha Fixed investment spending ($MX/ha.) 73.84 365.94
irrigD Irrigation dummy 0.11 0.37
soilq Soil quality (1: Bad, 2: Regular, 3: Good) 2.33 2.20
slope Slope (1: Plain, 2: Sloped, 3: Very steep) 1.55 1.41
droughtD Drought dummy 0.33 0.39
m1400 Plot is > 1400 masl. 0.76 0.63
ownseedD Used own seed (%) 0.69 0.13
walktime Walking time from the parcel to the com-
munity center (mins.)
39.04 38.41
N Number of observations 476 75
traditional maize plots are cultivated with saved seed, as opposed to 13% of modern maize
plots.
Therefore, we specify plot-speci¯c production functions for TVs and MVs separately as:
Qi = gi(VjP;Zq) + vi; i = TV;MV (10)
where V is a vector of variable inputs and P is a vector of plot characteristics such as
soil quality, slope and elevation. Zq is a vector of household characteristics that a®ect
production through their e®ects on preferences due to the non-recursive nature of farmers'
problem, and v is a random error. Ideally we would like to estimate the production functions
using panel data to control for unobservable household variables (e.g., ability) that a®ect
production. Given the cross sectional nature of our data, we use regional ¯xed e®ects and
cluster the regression standard errors at the Rural Development District (DDR) level to17
correct for potential error correlation due to unobserved characteristics that are common to
all households within a DDR.21
We estimate the production functions using a log-Cobb-Douglas speci¯cation as in Jacoby
(1993) and Skou¯as (1994), which provides a good approximation for general input elasticities
when the focus is not on the production structure (Murthy, 2002). The estimated coe±cients




Q; hence the estimated MPL of labor is ^ MPL = ^ ¯
Q
L (Jacoby,
1993; Skou¯as, 1994). We use the ^ MPL to calculate the estimated shadow prices for both
varieties based on equation 9.
Estimates of production functions for TVs and MVs can su®er from selection bias if there
are unobservable variables that a®ect both farmers' crop choice and productivity (Vella,
1998). Using the Heckman procedure, we fail to reject the null hypothesis associated with
sample-selectivity bias; the p-values of the Wald test to test the independence of the selection
and outcome equations were 0.48 and 0.86, for TVs and MVs respectively.22 This result is
robust to di®erent speci¯cations with di®erent sets of identifying instruments.
One might suspect that farmers who produce maize exclusively for home consumption
and those who produce it commercially di®er in terms of production practices. We de¯ne
commercially oriented farmers as those who sold more than 30% of their maize in the survey
year. (They constituted 27% of all maize farmers.) Di®erences between commercial and
21Rural Development Districts are districts de¯ned by SAGARPA (Secretary of Agriculture, Ranching, Rural
Development, Fisheries, and Food Supply) that have similar production potentials. See http://www.cem.
itesm.mx/derecho/nlegislacion/federal/35/index.html Capitulo 6, 7 and 8.
22We use six exogenous variables as identifying instruments: the percentage of plots in the same village
that are cultivated with TVs/MVs excluding the farmer's own plots, the percentage of the village maize
production that is marketed excluding the farmer's sales, the percentage of households in the village that
had o®-farm income from employment in other parts of Mexico and in the US in 1980, whether the farmer
speaks an indigenous language very well and whether he/she has saved any maize seed for longer than 2
years at the time of the survey. Given that the Heckman regressions are not the focus of the present paper,
they are available from the authors upon request.18
non-commercial farmers with regard to their use of labor, animal traction and plot slope are
statistically signi¯cant (table 3).
















No 62.33 19.89 4.39 16.36 2.31 1.57
Yes 24.80 18.68 4.84 5.18 2.31 1.33
Di®erence 37.53¤ 1.21 -0.45 11.18¤ 0 0.24¤
¤ Indicates that the di®erence between the means of two groups is statistically signi¯cant
at %10 level using a t-test.
We employ a two-stage least squares (2SLS) model with instrumental variables (IV) to
control for the endogeneity of farmers' status as commercial or subsistence farmers when
estimating the production functions. Two-stage least squares estimation employs a linear
probability model with instruments in the ¯rst stage. Because the ¯rst stage involves a
binary variable, the use of a probit model might seem more intuitive; however, the probit
depends on the normality assumption. Angrist (2000) shows that a linear probability model
is consistent regardless of whether the ¯rst stage is linear or not, concluding that "it is safer
to use a linear ¯rst stage." We report the results of the 2SLS method in table 4.23
The following instruments are used for farmer commercial status: the percentage of vil-
lage maize production sold, the time required to travel from the household dwelling to the
community center on foot, and dummy variables identifying whether the household had an
immediate family member working for a wage o®-farm or as a migrant in Mexico or in the US
in 1980, 22 years prior to the survey. The percentage of village maize production sold in the
market may a®ect farmers' commercial orientation through network e®ects or village market
structure. However, this variable should not a®ect productivity except through its in°uence
23The results of IV-probit model are very similar to the 2SLS results and are available upon request.19
Table 4. Production Functions Estimated with 2SLS to Control for the En-





















Signi¯cance levels: ¤ : 10% ¤¤ : 5% ¤ ¤ ¤ : 1%
y We rescaled soil quality and slope as (-1,0,1) to prevent unneces-
sary imposition of a cardinal meaning to categorical variables.
on the farmer commercial-status dummy. Community centers are usually where markets are
located; hence, the time required to go there may be correlated with the commercial farmer
dummy, but it should not a®ect productivity directly. Even if there is no market at the
community center, this variable can instrument for access to information about marketing
opportunities that may be correlated with commercial farming. Wage work and migration
experience may in°uence attitudes towards participating in markets or the capacity to do so
(e.g., information networks outside the village). However, these variables are measured far
enough back in time that they should not a®ect current production.20
Table 5. Tests for the Validity of Instrumental Variables (p-values reported)
Tests TV MV
Underid. test: H0=Eqn. is underidenti¯ed
Anderson canonical correlation 0.01 0
Overid. tests: H0=Overid. restrictions are valid
Hansen J Statistic 0.41 0.25
Anderson-Rubin F-test 0.27 0.69
An Anderson Canonical Correlations test easily rejects the hypothesis that the equation
is underidenti¯ed (5).24 Overidenti¯cation tests fail to reject the hypothesis that the in-
struments are uncorrelated with the error term and correctly excluded from the production
function equation.25 Therefore, we conclude that the instruments are reasonably valid.
The results of the production function estimation are reported in table 4.26 All of the esti-
mated input elasticities are positive as expected. There are some notable di®erences between
the production functions for TVs and MVs. There are signi¯cant decreasing returns to scale
to land for TVs but not MVs. Drought, slope and elevation are correlated signi¯cantly and
negatively with per hectare productivity of MVs, but the correlation is not signi¯cant for
TVs, suggesting that, other things constant, TVs are more resilient to sub-optimal growing
conditions, consistent with ¯ndings of past research (Bellon and Taylor, 1993; Smale et al.,
1994).
24The Anderson canonical correlations test is a likelihood-ratio test of whether the equation is identi¯ed,
i.e., that the excluded instruments are \relevant," meaning correlated with the endogenous regressors. These
tests are done using Stata's ivreg2 command (Baum et al., 2002).
25Hansen J statistic tests the joint null hypothesis is that the instruments are valid instruments, i.e., uncor-
related with the error term, and that the excluded instruments are correctly excluded from the estimated
equation. Under the null, the test statistic is distributed as chi-squared in the number of overidentifying
restrictions. Anderson-Rubin statistic is a Wald test that is distributed as chi-squared with L2 degrees of
freedom, where L2 is the number of excluded instruments.
26Because the number of plots per household vary, the reciprocal of the square root of the number of plots
for each household is used as a weight to ensure equal representation.21
Table 6. Summary Statistics for Estimated Shadow Prices and Observed
Market Prices
Variable TV MV
Shadow price for full sample 48.34 13.77
Shadow price for sellers 20.50 5.19
Shadow price for non-sellers 58.18 25.53
Observed market price/kg. 1.98 1.57
The estimated labor elasticities are the basis for calculating the marginal product of labor
(MPL) and shadow prices of home-produced maize for each farmer using Equation 9.27 Table
6 summarizes shadow prices for sellers and non-sellers of both maize variety categories.
Estimated shadow prices are signi¯cantly higher for TVs than MVs, and they are higher
for non-sellers of both varieties. The average village-level market price is lower than the
shadow prices for all groups. The di®erence between market prices and estimated shadow
prices is large, consistent with inelastic marginal value product curves in traditional farming
systems. This is illustrated in ¯gure 2. Very high shadow prices indicate that more labor
is applied than would appear optimal if the marginal value product of labor were estimated
using the market price of maize. This excess application of labor need not be large to produce
high shadow prices if the marginal product of labor is inelastic. In the ¯gure, observing a
labor input of L0 instead of L¤ implies a shadow price that far exceeds the market price. The
high levels of labor use observed in these households is consistent with a higher subjective
valuation of landraces, especially by non-sellers. Smale (2005) argues that labor to land
ratios explain where landraces are still grown and will continue to be grown. A high labor
to land ratio, ceteris paribus, corresponds to a high shadow price in the current model.
27Equation 9 essentially assumes that the labor market is perfect for the households in the sample, because
it uses market wages to value their time. We have tested this assumption by estimating production functions
with family labor and hired labor separated. We calculated the shadow wages for family labor and ran the
test of separability as in Jacoby (1993) for farmers who sold some of their product in the market. We fail to
reject the separability hypothesis and conclude that shadow wages are not signi¯cantly di®erent from market










Figure 2. Inelastic V MPL for subsistence maize production. An increase in labor from
L¤ to L0 would decrease the MPL by a lot resulting in a high shadow price. The decreasing
distance between the two lines indicates the decrease in the shadow price as more output is
produced with more labor.
To test whether the estimated shadow prices are signi¯cantly di®erent from market prices,
we use the method in Jacoby (1993) and Skou¯as (1994). The regression
^ ½ = ® + ¯p + u; (11)
was estimated for sellers and non-sellers of both TVs and MVs to test the null hypothesis of
® = 0; ¯ = 1. Under the null, the market price re°ects the value of the marginal product of
labor. Rejection of H0 implies that market prices do not re°ect farmers' subjective valuation
of the crop; thus, estimated shadow prices are a more accurate basis for understanding farmer
behavior. We estimate Equation 11 using weighted least squares and the same weights as in
the production function estimation. We also use village level clusters to control for possible
error correlation among farmers in the same village.23
Table 7. Are Estimated Shadow Prices Equal to Observed Market Prices?
MV TV
^ ® ^ ¯ ^ ® ^ ¯
Seller -1.94 5.22 21.08 0.70
F-test (0.17) (0.00)
t-tests (0.83) (0.44) (0.38) (0.97)
Non-seller -15.03 40.10 52.95 2.62
F-test (0.17) (0.00)
t-tests (0.77) (0.41) (0.06) (0.89)
(p-values in parentheses)
Table 7 summarizes the results of F-tests and t-tests corresponding to the null hypothesis.
For MVs, we fail to reject the null hypothesis of equality of shadow and market prices with
both tests regardless of whether or not the farmer sold maize.
For sellers of TVs, the F-test rejects the joint hypothesis; however, the individual t-tests
fail to reject the equality of shadow and market prices. We can conclude that although the
average estimated shadow price for sellers of TVs is higher than the local market price, this
di®erence is not statistically signi¯cant; hence, we can use market prices to represent the
value of domestic maize to a farmer who is selling it in the market.
For non-sellers of TVs, in contrast, both F and t-tests easily reject the null hypothesis
that estimated shadow prices are equal to market prices: ^ ® is signi¯cantly di®erent from
zero at the 6% level.
4.2. What predicts high shadow prices? Based on the theoretical model developed in
Section 3, endogenous shadow prices depend on household characteristics (through pref-
erences and endowments), plot characteristics and indicators of market access. Table 8
summarizes the sample means of estimated shadow prices and some socio-economic and
market access variables for the non-sellers of TVs by region. The South-Southeast region
has the highest estimated shadow prices and the highest percentage of indigenous farmers.24
Table 8. Sample Means of Socio-economic and Market Access Variables by Region
Region ^ ½ indig. wqtile o®armD ownseed TC/kg
South-Southeast 84.95 0.72 1.5 0.38 0.69 0
Central 34.25 0.26 2.06 0.5 0.75 0.02
Western Cent. 56.72 0.02 2.95 0.47 0.36 0
Northwest 0.18 0 4.75 0.75 0.25 0.00
Northeast 20.05 0 2.88 0.63 0.40 0.01
Total 58.18 0.38 2.07 0.46 0.63 0.01
This region also exhibits the lowest levels of wealth and o®-farm income in the sample. Most
farmers in the Northwest and Northeast regions have some kind of o®-farm income, and
they have the smallest shadow prices for TVs. Wealth and o®-farm income both appear to
be negatively correlated with farmers' subjective valuation of TVs, based on unconditional
means. More farmers in the Southern and Central regions use their own seed, and this seems
to be correlated with high shadow prices. The last column summarizes the transportation
costs per kilogram paid by farmers to buy/sell maize. These costs are very small and cannot
justify the high estimated shadow prices.
The di®erences between estimated shadow and observed market prices can be analyzed
econometrically using the following equation:
^ ½ ¡ p = f(P;Z) + u: (12)
P, as in equation 10, is a vector of plot characteristics that a®ect production; Z is a vector
of preference shifters, of which Zq is a subset. The fact that ^ ½ is not observed directly but
estimated with error introduces an additional source of variance to the standard errors in
this regression (Dumont et al., 2005). We use bootstrapping to correct for this potential bias
following Cameron and Trivedi (2005).25
Determinants of farmers' crop choices and preferences for traditional crops from other
studies are included in the vector Z (Bellon and Smale, 1999; Van Dusen, 2000; Meng, 1997;
Brush and Meng, 1998; Smale, 2006). They include: wealth, gender, age, education, land
size, animals owned, the share of maize area, migration, o®-farm income, credit access, time
spent to go to community center, government transfers, soil quality, slope, altitude, irrigation
and regional controls. All of these variables have di®erent correlations with on farm diversity
in di®erent settings as summarized in Smale (2006). Indigenous identity is often cited as
being correlated with the cultivation of traditional crops; however, it is generally absent from
econometric analyses (Brush and Perales, 2007; Perales et al., 2005; Preibisch et al., 2002).
We include a dummy variable to test for an e®ect of indigenous status on shadow-price
divergence. It equals one if the farmer speaks an indigenous language and zero otherwise.
Table 9 presents the results of the price-divergence regression, with standard errors clus-
tered by household and village to control for possible error correlation across plots of the
same household or of di®erent households within the same village. We use two di®erent
speci¯cations: Column (1) uses only socio-economic variables that shape farmers' prefer-
ences, and Column (2) includes variables related to farmers' market access in addition to
socio-economic variables.
The coe±cient on the indigenous dummy is signi¯cant and positive. This indicates that
non-market values of TVs captured in shadow prices are higher for indigenous farmers,
underlining their role as stewards of genetic diversity. The gender dummy is also signi¯cant:
male farmers appear to value TVs more highly than female farmers.
Bellon and Taylor (1993) ¯nd that cultivation of TVs is negatively correlated with high
soil quality in the region they studied in southeastern Mexico. We ¯nd that soil quality is26
Table 9. Decomposing the Di®erence Between Shadow and Market Prices of
Traditional Maize, i.e. ^ ½ ¡ p. (Standard errors are bootstrapped.)










wealth ind. -2.99 -2.83
age -0.26 -0.17
educ -1.48 -1.1
area owned -0.05 -0.09




Western Cent. 44.81 51.89¤
Northwest 18.72 71.81
Constant -10.8 -13.66
Root MSE 99.33 97.32
AIC 3793 3787
Signi¯cance levels : ¤ : 10% ¤¤ : 5% ¤ ¤ ¤ : 1%
negatively and signi¯cantly correlated with farmers' subjective valuation of TVs, consistent
with that ¯nding. Irrigation is also negatively and signi¯cantly correlated with shadow
prices. Perales et al. (2003) ¯nd that altitude is positively correlated with the cultivation of
maize landraces in Mexico in his small sample of villages in Central Mexico. This variable
was not found to be a signi¯cant determinant of shadow prices using the national data.
The insigni¯cance of wealth, household size and farmer human capital mirror the con°ict-
ing in°uences of these variables on seed-variety choice elsewhere in the literature (Smale,
2006; Bellon and Taylor, 1993). Shadow prices are not signi¯cantly associated with farm
size. It has been argued that international migration is a deterrent to on-farm conserva-
tion of maize landraces in Mexico (Nadal, 2000; Turrent and Serratos-Hernandez, 2004).27
Inasmuch as migration and planting decisions are likely to be correlated, we included a
dummy variable identifying households with at least one member who ever participated in
the Bracero Program.28 If migration shifts households' preferences towards market goods,
we might expect that households with migration histories will have a lower valuation for
TVs. Although the Bracero variable has a negative coe±cient, it is not signi¯cant.
Three variables represent market access: the percentage of farmers in the village that have-
o® farm income (otherso®D), the percentage of farmers in the village that have some kind
of credit (otherscredit) and the time it takes for the farmer to go to the community center
(walktime).29 The relationship between on-farm diversity and market access is theoretically
ambiguous (Van Dusen and Taylor, 2005). Although some previous studies ¯nd a negative
e®ect (Bellon and Taylor, 1993; Meng, 1997; Van Dusen, 2000; Smale et al., 1994), we do
not ¯nd evidence that farmers' valuation of TVs decreases with market access.
4.3. Additional Estimation Concerns and Caveats. It is not possible to fully control
for heterogeneity among households when estimating production functions using cross-section
data. We experimented with the method proposed by Barrett et al. (2004), to control for
household unobservables using cross-section data. However, in the ENHRUM data, there
were insu±cient households cultivating both varieties at the same time to do this. The best
that could be done in this regard was to include regional ¯xed-e®ects and cluster. Although
these methods address the unobservables at the regional level and the error correlation within
DDRs, they do not directly address household unobservables. Fortunately, the ENHRUM
data provide a rich set of controls, including plot quality variables, to capture heterogeneity
28The Bracero Program was actually a series of binational agreements under which Mexican workers were
contracted legally to work in the US, primarily in agriculture. The program lasted from 1942 until 1964,
during which time approximately 4 million \braceros" came to the US.
29The ¯rst two variables exclude the farmer himself/herself to remove potential endogeneity of these variables.28
among households. A ¯xed-e®ects model would not allow one explicitly to estimate the ways
in which time-invariant variables, like plot traits, ethnic status and geographic location,
in°uence shadow prices. The in°uences of these variables on shadow prices is a focus of the
present research. Neither ¯xed-e®ects nor cross-sectional methods control for time-varying
unobservables. The endogeneity and selectivity issues controlled for in our econometrics are
germane regardless of whether or not panel data are available.
One might argue that because production is uncertain and farmers are risk averse, more
labor may be applied to maize as a mechanism to hedge against down-side risk, in°ating
shadow price estimates. Risk and uncertainty are not part of our model, and it is not clear
how one would identify their e®ects on shadow prices using these data. Nevertheless, if risk
did account for the discrepancy between shadow and market prices, we would not expect
to observe higher shadow prices for TVs than MVs unless the latter were less risky. This
is not consistent with received wisdom (Feder, 1980; Day-Rubenstein and Heisey, 2007) nor
with farmer's perceptions of the risk attributes of traditional and improved varieties (Smale
et al., 1994, 2001; Edmeades et al., 2004; Bellon et al., 2006). To the extent that farmers' risk
aversion is decreasing in wealth, our model may control for risk attitudes indirectly through
the wealth index.
The methodology used here is applied to traditional varieties as a group. It does not
test for di®erences in shadow prices among TVs. While ideally one might wish to estimate
shadow prices for each variety, this is not possible given the available data, and identi¯cation
challenges multiply when new varieties are added to the analysis. Understanding the non-
market incentives for cultivating diverse varieties, we believe, is a priority for future research.29
The method proposed here can serve as a basis for doing this, and it is °exible enough to be
applied to other crops.
5. Summary and Conclusions
When farmers attach signi¯cant non-market values to their crops, resource allocation
decisions are better modeled by allowing decision prices to deviate from market prices. Using
market prices to value output may lead to puzzling results when, as frequently found, farmers
allocate more resources to production than would appear to be justi¯ed by conventional
pro¯t-maximization criteria. Shadow prices that deviate from market prices may confound
estimates of supply response. Farmers may exhibit an inelastic supply response to market
price shocks even if the supply elasticity with respect to endogenous shadow prices is high.
Empirically, we ¯nd signi¯cant divergence between shadow and market prices of traditional
maize varieties in Mexico. Controlling for variables conventionally used to represent market
transaction costs, this ¯nding is consistent with an asymmetric market in which traits of
home-grown maize valued by farmers and their households are not re°ected in market prices.
In contrast, estimated shadow prices are not signi¯cantly higher than market prices for
improved maize varieties. High shadow prices create incentives to grow subsistence crops
with non-market values.
These results have obvious implications for modeling supply response but also for designing
programs to promote on-farm crop genetic resource (CGR) conservation. CGR policies can
be made more cost e®ective by targeting populations with high shadow prices, for which de
facto conservation is more likely (Bellon and Smale, 1999; Louette et al., 1997; Peterson, 2000;
Altieri, 2004). The insigni¯cance of wealth, credit and o®-farm income variables in explaining
shadow prices suggests that there may not necessarily be a tradeo® between development and30
conservation in populations that presently place a high value on growing traditional crops.
More resources may be needed to promote in-situ conservation of TVs in regions where
indigenous identity is not strong, irrigation projects are being developed or programs to
improve soil quality exist. The potential negative e®ects of such projects on the cultivation of
TVs in areas of diversity might be counteracted via the use of ancillary programs to increase
farmers' incentives to maintain TVs, for example, conservation payments or programs to
create niche markets for exotic maize varieties. Shadow price estimates can serve as a guide
to determine required subsidies in these cases. Although policies may increase the incentives
to grow TVs in areas where de facto incentives are low, they are likely to be costly. A more
e®ective way of allocating conservation budgets might be to prioritize ex-situ conservation
in regions where farm households do not presently attach a high non-market value to the
traits of TVs.31
Appendix: KKT Conditions








s + w ¹ T ¡ wL + ¹ Y ¡ pmXm ¡ wXl] + ¹1[g(L;A) ¡ Xs
s ¡ Xh
s ] + ¹2Xs
s + ¹3Xh
s + ¹4L
The ¯rst order conditions (FOC) are:
Xs
s : ¸ps = ¹1 ¡ ¹2 (14)
Xs
h : MUs = ¹1 ¡ ¹3 (15)
Xm : MUm = ¸pm (16)
Xl : MUl = ¸w (17)
L : ¹1MPL = ¸w ¡ ¹4 (18)
Leisure and the consumption of the market good cannot be zero by assumption, hence we can
use the FOC to get their optimal conditions. Farmer equates the monetized value of his marginal
utility of leisure and the market good respectively to wage rate and the market price at the op-
timum. We need to use the KKT conditions for optimal choices of Xs
s;Xh
s and L because of the
possibility of corner solutions for these variables. For the KKT conditions to be su±cient for a max-
imum, we assume that the utility function is pseudoconcave in addition to the quasi-concavity and
quasi-convexity assumptions above. Pseudoconcavity also implies quasi-concavity because U(.) is
pseudoconcave if and only if its gradient vanishes only at the global optimum and it is quasi-concave
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: ¹1MPL ¡ ¸w + ¹4 = 0 (25)
@L
@¹4
: L ¸ 0 (26)
¹4L = 0 (27)
Let us interpret the di®erent cases implied by the KKT conditions related to the production and
consumption of the subsistence crop:
Case 1: Xs
s > 0;Xh
s > 0;Q(L;A) ¡ Xs
s ¡ Xh
s > 0;L > 0;¹4 = 0:
If the sum of home consumption and sales of Q is less than the total production, market
price has to be equal to zero by 19. Therefore there will never be waste since market prices




s > 0;L = 0;¹4 ¸ 0:
This case is impossible, since the farmer has to have L > 0 to be able to sell any Q. For
L = 0, we can similarly rule out the cases where Xs
s > 0;Xh





s = 0;L = 0;¹4 ¸ 0:








This condition indicates that the \shadow value of marginal product" of an extra unit of
labor allocated to the cultivation of Q is less than the market wage. For farmers in this
group the non-market bene¯ts of the subsistence crop are not important. Therefore it is
not worthwhile to allocate any labor to subsistence crop production.
Case 4: Xs
s > 0;Xh
s > 0;L > 0;¹2;3;4 = 0:
This case characterizes the farmer who sells part of Q in the market. For this group of
farmers market price equals shadow price, i.e. ½ = ps =
¹1
¸ and we can safely use market
price to represent farmers' valuation of the subsistence crop. Therefore, the optimality
conditions for allocation of labor is the conventional condition, where farmer equates the
value of marginal product of labor to the wage rate, i.e.:
psMPL = w: (29)
Case 5: Xs
s > 0;Xh
s = 0;L > 0;¹3 ¸ 0;¹4 = 0:









This case is similar to Case 3 and we can use market prices. The case where both Xh
s and
Xs
s are equal to zero when L > 0 is not likely to occur (given the \no-waste" assumption
in Case 1), hence will not be considered here.
Case 6: Xs
s = 0;Xh
s > 0;L > 0;¹2 ¸ 0;¹3;4 = 0:
This case characterizes subsistence farmers, who consume all of their subsistence crop at








Farmer is not selling Q since he values it more than the market. Rewriting the left hand




¸ ¡ ps provides more intuition by monetizing all terms.
The monetized value of relaxing the non-negativity constraint on sales by one unit is equal
to the subjective value of one more unit of production using the same inputs minus the
market value of that crop. Hence the conclusion that the shadow price is greater than or
equal to the market price for farmers who do not sell any subsistence crop given market
prices.
The optimality condition for labor sets the \shadow value of marginal product" of labor
equal to market wage:
¹1
¸
MPL = w (32)
For this group of farmers we need to estimate shadow prices to understand how they value
their subsistence crop, and how they make resource allocation decisions.33
Appendix B: Maps
Figure 3. Regional distribution of the communities in the Mexican National Rural
Household Survey (ENHRUM 2003)34
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